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REPORTS OF CASES
DE'fERMINED IX

THE SUPREl\1E COURT
01<' 'fHE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

[47 C.2d 11; 300 P.2d 831]

[L.A. No. 23679.

In Bank.

Aug. 17, 1956.]

NATHAN H. SCHUR, INC. (a Corporation), Plaintiff and
Respondent, v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA et aL, Defendants and Respondents.
ROY C. TROEGER et al., Appellants, v. CITY O:F' SANTA
MONICA et al., Respondents.
Licenses-Application for and Issuance-Declaratory Relief.In an action for declaratory relief against a city and its police
chief wherein a supplemental complaint alleged that plaintiffs
had applied for renewal of their licenses for the conduct of
amusement games, that such application was refused, that the
city council, at a public hearing demanded by plaintiffs, found
their games were not a violation of the state gambling laws,
and that notwithstanding such finding the police chief still
refused to issue the licenses, the trial court improperly refused
to review the city council's determination.
Gaming-Licenses-Issuance-Injunctive Relief.-·In an action
for declaratory relief which was basically one to enjoin city
officials from possibly committing a crime by issuing licenses
for gambling games contrary to state law, although it was also
asked that they be restrained from expending city funds in
issuing these particular licenses, a judgment declaring that the
games were contrary to state laws could not stand because the
McK. Dig. References: [1] Licenses,§ 35; [2] Gaming, § 3; [3]
1\funieipal Corporations, § 478; [ 4] Appeal and Error, ~ 90.
( 11 )

issues are limited.
Appeal-Persons Entitled to Appeal.-A plaintiff in one action
uu'''wcu• rendered in another action which
issued to him is aguu,,m,,u" rendered in the
"vrr~vuu<tct:u

for trial.

of the Superior Court of Los
Swain, Judge. Reversed.
relief.
and
in second Schur action, and judgment
action, reversed.
Bowman and Thomas W. LeSage for Appellants.
for Hespondents.
,J.~Nathan

H. Schur, a corporation, commenced
the
of Santa Monica and its police
the first it asserted that an ordinance of said city,
hereinafter
was unconstitutional in limiting the
be issued for conducting games of skill to
inhabitants. In the second action it
4226 of the
code, infra, is invalid
laws in the
the city

Troeger, and fh-e other
action
called the Troeger
the
its
and police chief alleging that
are the holders of
licenses granted by the
for the conduct
; that they have submitted
for the annual
renewal of their licenses with the police chief but that he will
their applications on the
that their
gambling proscribed
the Pl'Ilal
operated by them are of skill and not
gambling laws but that a dispute exists
them and
on tl1e subject. They ask for a declaration of their
that it be ordered that the licenses be issued to them
the city and its officers be enjoined from
with
businesses.
The two Schur actions and the Troeger action
consolifor trial but the consolidation was vacated as to the
Schur action because of the result the court
and did reach in the second Schur action; that
ordinance was valid but the games licensed and
licensed were a violation of the law aside from the claim of
made in the first Schur action.
the
Schur action is still pending and
not
importance here.
Prior to trial and after motion therefor
D'r'""''''"rl in that action, Troeger filed a
which it was alleged that the police chief had denied
applications for a renewal of their licenses that a
and regular public hearing after due notice
was
had by the city council in which evidence was taken and a
TIV()YO,()CL>rt

J!J 1\'A'!'l!AN IJ,

lsc. 1:. Crn o< 8ANTA MoNICA 147 C.2d

reporter was
and the council found that plaintiffs'
games were not a violation of the gambling laws of the state
and
were entitled to licenses; that notwithstanding such
finding the police chief still refused to issue the licenses. It
\YHS further alleged that evidence was introduced at the hearand Kathan Schur, the principal owner of Nathan Schur,
appeared at the hearing and testified in opposition to 'rroeger's applications for licenses. The allegations of
the supplemental eomplaint were admitted at the trial. There
is no dispute about the occurrence of the events alleged in the
supplemental complaint. Troeger's offer to the court of a
transcript of the hearing before the council was refused and
his request that the court review those proceedings was denied.
Over his objection evidence was received on the question of
whether the games were of skill or a violation of the Penal
Code antigambling laws.
In its findings the court found Schur's allegations in its
second action to be true except that the ordinance (city code
section 4226) was valid; that the games for which licenses
were sought by Troeger were of chance and violated the Penal
Code; that the expenditure of public funds by the city in
licensing the gambling games for printing, preparing and
filing applications for licenses and wages for "administering
such games" was illegal; that the city police chief lawfully
refused licenses to Troeger and his coplaintiffs. The judgments
declared the rights as found and enjoined the city "from expending . . . any public funds of the City . . . in the licensing· of any said gambling games played or operated in violation of Chapters 9 and 10 of Title 9, California Penal Code;
and said defendants . . . are . . . enjoined from expending
or disbursing any public funds of the City of Santa Monica,
for the printing, preparing, issuance, or filing of applications
for permits or licenses for any of said gambling games played
or operated in violation of Chapters 9 or 10 of Title 9,
California Penal Code"; and that Troeger take nothing.
Troeger appeals from the judgment in each action, the
second Schur action and Troeger action. At the trial of the
consolidated actions the trial court heard evidence on the
question of whether the games for which licenses were sought
by Troeger were of skill or gambling. It refused to review
the transcript of the hearing and finding of the city council
which was set forth in Troeger's supplemental complaint.
Section 4226 of the city code of ordinances provides: "No
person shall keep, conduct or maintain within the City any
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room, apartment or place used in whole or in part as a
where any game not mentioned in Section 330 or 330a
the Penal Code of the State of California, is played, condealt or carried on with cards, dice, balls, billiard
pool balls, cues or other device when chance is the
predominate or a substantial factor in determining any winner
of such game or any portion, part or phase of such game and
when for the winning of such game or any portion, part or
thereof, any person received in any manner, money,
e;hecks, chips, credit or any other representative of value or
any merchandise or anything of value; nor shall any person
conduct or maintain within the City any house, room,
apartment, or place used in whole or in part as a place where
any game not mentioned in Section 330 or 330a of the Penal
Code of the State of California is played, conducted, dealt
carried on with cards, dice, cues or other device when
skill is the predominate factor in determining the winner of
such game, except such games of skill accommodating not
more than 50 players or participants at any one time and for
playing of such game is paid in advance, and where the
or award to any person for winning any such game
any portion, part or phase thereof consists only of merchandise not exceeding $25.00 in value.'' Section 6122 provides that any person required to obtain a license to engage
business "shall first obtain a permit to conduct such
business from the Chief of Police. In order to obtain such a
permit, a written application shall be filed with said Chief of
Police, which application shall contain a statement of intention as to the location and extent of the premises to be
occupied, and in addition such application for a permit to
engage in any business licensed pursuant to Section 6207 of
Code shall contain the name of any person financially
interested in the business in any manner. The Chief of Police,
within a reasonable time after the submission of such applishall ascertain that the proposed location is within
legal limits for such purpose, and that the purposes for
which the prem,ises are to be used will not be in conflict with
laws of the State of California . ... When satisfied that
there is no apparent danger to public health and safety of the
of the City, that the applicant, its officers or agents,
any, are morally responsible and have a good reputation,
that the conducting of such business in such location will be
.conformance with all laws and ordinances, the Chief of
Police shall issue a permit to said applicant. Such permit
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error in not reviewing the determination
in accordance with the holding of this
Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260 [246 P.2d
not concerned with the original complaint in
action or with whether relief could have been
thai
beeause as shown by the supplemental
followed the prescribed administrative proto them. They were applicants for licenses
They applied to the chief of
refused. They then demanded
by the city council with the
All was done in accordance with
which required the denial of a license if the
sought to be licensed violated the state
In the Fascination case, supra, the
contained substantially the same provirc•Q..-,p,n"t to licenses for games as do the city ordivYe there held that such laws called for a hearing
fJU'ccn<vu for the license by the city officials; that
the license a review by mandamus may be had
which the question was not whether
the state Penal Code but whether the
officials was sufficient to support their
acted on the applications
remedies. 'I'hey
appears from their supple-

inasmuch as local officials
the review did not

is made of
should have reviewed
council as we held
it refused to do, and, thereaction must be reversed.
in
second Schur action presents a
It will be recalled that the persons named
different
Schur as those who had had licenses issued to them were
iu the
action. Basically the
officials from possibly committing
licenses for gambling games contrary to
it was also asked that they be restrained
'"-~~"c,,,cucn"' the
funds involved in issuing these partieand that is as far as the judgment went in
it did declare the games were
We believe that judgment cannot
stand because the
were vested with authority to
make the determination and the
method of relief therefrom was
a review of their action without taking independevidence on the
; that unless the conduct
!JLcuuc;u of
a nuisance as declared by the Legiswill not
it even if it constitutes a crime,
tribunal for the enforcement of the criminal law is the court in an appropriate criminal proceeding.
[3] It is true that a taxpayer may obtain preventive relief
of funds by a municipal coragainst the illegal
§ 526a; Simpson v. City of Los
poration. (Code Civ.
40 CaJ.2d 271
P.2d 4.64] .)
There appears to be no reason, however, why a municipal
with Yalid
to do so, holding a public
determination with reflicense to engage in a certain
to
its action in a trial
one attacking its determifor a license.
of the
·with the power of determination
reviewable
mandamus or cer-

18

NATHAN

H.

CrT¥ OF SA~TA ::\Io~rcA

C.2d

tiorari in which the issues are limited as set forth in Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, supra, 39 Cal.2d 260. Here there was
a public hearing on the precise issue, whether the games for
which licenses were sought violated the Penal Code, and due
notice was given to all concerned which would include a taxpayer. Moreover, Schur, the taxpayer, participated in the
hearing. lV irin
85
497
P.2d
470 J' is not to the
. rrhere no local authorities were
vested with valid authority to determine whether a person
was entitled to a license. Here the local authorities were
so vested and Schur participated in the hearing before the
council. Its relief is limited as is Troeger's to a review of
the action by the hearing body .
.As heretofore seen, the Schur action is basically one to
enjoin the alleged commission of a crime. In People v. Lirn,
18 Cal.2d 872 [118 P.2d 472], the court held that although
gambling places were nuisances under the common law they
could not be abated unless made such by statute. There the
district attorney was seeking to halt games by proceedings in
court. The court said at page 876: "\Vhile these cases
indicate that gambling houses were recognized as public nuisances in criminal prosecutions, they do not hold that an
equity action on behalf of the state might be maintained at
common law to enjoin the operation of a gambling house. On
the contrary, it is clear that the jurisdiction of equity was
very sparingly exercised on behalf of the sovereign to enjoin
public nuisances . . . . .An action on behalf of the state,
therefore, to enjoin activity which violates general concepts of
public policy finds no basis in the doctrines of the common
law. . . . The courts of this state, however, have refused
to sanction the granting of injunctions on behalf of the state
merely by a judicial extension of the definition of 'public
nuisance.' . . . The courts have thus refused to grant injunctions on behalf of the state except where the objectionable
activity can be brought within the terms of the statutory
definition of public nuisance. Where the legislature has felt
that the summary power of equity was required to control
activity contrary to public policy, it has enacted statutes
specifying that such activity constitutes a public nuisance
"Which may be enjoined in an action brought on behalf of the
state. . . .
''Conduct against which injunctions are sought in behalf
of the public is frequently criminal in nature. While this
alone will not prevent the intervention of equity where a clear
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may be
under the criminal
to similar puni;;;hmeut for the same acts. For these reasons
is loath to interfere where the standards of public
can be enforced by resort to the criminal law, and in
absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the
courts should not broaden the field in which injunctions
criminal activity will be granted." (St>e Civ. Code,
subd. 1; Intm·naf<ional etc. W orlcers v. Landowitz, 20
Cal.2d 418 [126 P.2d 609]
Caution should be observed
therefore upon rt>trial to avoid violating that rule. It should
be obserwd that whether licenses are or are not issued
criminal law is still open to Schur.
[4] Schur elaims its judgmrnt is not subject to review,
but as heretofore stated, the actions were consolidated and
rrroeger appt>aled from the Schur judgment which in effect
licenses from being issued to Troeger. Troeger is
thus aggrieved and may appeal from and have reviewed the
Schur judgment. (See Kellett v. J1farvel, 6 Cal.2d 464 [58
P.2d 649]; Wolfson v. Beatty, 118 Cal.App.2d 392 [257 P.2d

.)
The judgments in both the Schur and Troeger actions are
reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., and McComb, J., conenrred.

